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SOCIAL NETWORK. 
 
 
 
 
        Eiji Yamamura 
 
 
The lay judge system, a quasi-jury system, was introduced in Japan from May 
2009. This paper attempts to analyze Japanese people‟s attitude about the lay judge 
system by examining whether they show a willingness to serve as a lay judge.  The 
major findings from regression analysis are: (1) In general, people with a spouse 
inclined to adopt a negative attitude about serving as a lay judge. This tendency is, 
however, not observed in large cities. (2) Long-time residents and homeowners are more 
likely to have a negative attitude about serving as a lay judge. These results show that a 
tightly knitted interpersonal social network discourages people from serving as a lay 
judge. Because of the life time secrecy obligation and the penalty provisions for those 
who break this obligation, people with closer interpersonal ties are under greater 
pressure and strains, leading to larger psychological cost. The obligation and its penalty 
should be eased to improve people‟s attitudes about serving as a lay judge.  
(JEL I28, K23, K40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
    
As part of Japan‟s legal reform1 , the lay judge system, Saiban‟in Seido in 
Japanese, was introduced from 21 May 2009. Under this system, ordinary citizens will 
be involved in criminal proceedings as judges to help decide trial outcomes. Citizens are 
selected at random for the most serious criminal cases. “Once this system commences it 
is hoped that more people will feel involved in the justice process. The Ministry of 
Justice has been actively involved in publicizing and promoting the Saiban‟in system so 
that more people will be able to understand its role and functions” (Ministry of Justice 
2009). According to a survey conducted by the Supreme Court, 48% of respondents, 
however, expressed reluctance to serve as a lay judge. The results of a Cabinet Office 
survey showed 78 % were unwilling to take part (Kyodo News 2007). These results are 
despite the efforts of the Ministry of Justice. Thus a question is naturally raised; Why 
are people unwilling to serve as a lay judge? The negative attitude might be partly 
because of the requirement that lay judges are subject to a life time secrecy obligation. 
Lay judges who leak trial-related information will be punished. An American lawyer 
Colin Jones, a of law school professor in Japan, has criticized the secrecy requirement as 
follows: ”If the system‟s purpose is to educate the public about trials and have their 
views reflected in the criminal justice system, gagging participants for life seems 
counterproductive” (Jones 2009). From the standpoint of economics, the secrecy 
requirement can be considered to reduce the incentive to serve as a lay judge. 
  The Supreme Court issued a public promotional DVD to try and educate citizens 
about the lay judge system. The story of the DVD can be described as follows:  One day, 
Mr Murase, a typical Japanese white collar worker, receives a letter from the Supreme 
Court summoning him to act as a lay judge. “Having initially decided to refuse the 
request he is encouraged by his wife and eldest daughter to seize the opportunity and 
let his subordinates in the office have a chance to get by on their own... In the process of 
the trial Mr Murase is exposed to a number of judicial and moral dilemmas, but is also 
able to spend more time at home with his family and learn to trust his juniors at work to 
do their jobs by themselves.” (Harris 2007). This story, however, makes no mention of an 
                                                   
1 Some works are concerned with Japan‟s legal reforms of the lawyer market (Kinoshita 
2000, 2002; Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006). 
important issue, and so is out of touch with reality. As a matter of course, a lay judge 
must not divulge information to work place colleagues, neighbors and family members. 
Inevitably, Mr Murase would like to call for comments from his supportive family when 
he is confronted with difficulties in the trial. It seems also plausible that the supportive 
family and the trustful colleagues in his work place ask him about trial-related 
information. If a lay judge has supportive and trustful people such as family members 
and colleagues surrounding him or her, there are may situations in which a lay judge 
might be tempted to leak trial-related information. The secrecy requirement seems to be 
a more severe restriction for those who have the close interpersonal ties within a tightly 
knitted group such as a community or family. These people communicate and interact 
with members of their group through various channels2. As a consequence, a lay judge 
with such close ties is more apt to be tempted to reveal information3. A lay judge is thus 
exposed to a moral dilemma and an imposed burden overcoming such temptation, 
resulting in psychological cost. The secrecy requirement interacts with interpersonal 
ties, leading to discourage people from serving as a community servant.  
To make the lay judge system effective and for it to function well, it is important to 
examine how it was designed. Jurists have paid much attention to the lay judge system, 
especially from a comparative point of view (e.g., Dawson 1960; Landsman 2003; Hans 
2003, 2008). Recently, a number of jurists have explored the lay judge system as it 
applies to Japan (e.g., Bloom 2005; Ambler 2007; Wilson 2007; Levin 2008; Jones 2008; 
Soldwedel 2009). No speculation, however, has taken place concerning the incentives for 
citizens to serve as lay judges. Necessarily, economic analysis is called for to investigate 
how incentives to participate in the system increase4. Thanks to “Social and Political 
Consciousness Survey in 21st Century Japan”, researchers can obtain individual level 
data about people‟s attitudes towards serving as a lay judge. This paper uses this data 
to empirically analyze the incentive problem for the lay judge system by shedding light 
on the interaction between the secrecy requirement and interpersonal social networks. 
Further, based on findings arrived at through statistical estimation, some policy 
implications are suggested.  
       The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section II gives background and 
                                                   
2 Close ties within a community are considered to be social capital (Putnam 2000). 
3 It is found that surrounding people such as family members have an influence on an 
individual‟s opinion and political standpoint (Warner 1991; Edlund and Pande 
2002 ;Washington 2008). This can be explained theoretically (Becker and Murphy 2000). 
4 Voigt(2008) tried to examine how lay participation is associated with corruption 
within the judiciary, government effectiveness, and total factor productivity. 
provides an overview of the lay judge system. Some testable hypotheses about citizens‟ 
attitudes about serving as lay judges are then presented.  Section III details the 
construction of the data and a simple econometric framework to examine the 
hypotheses.  The results of the estimations and discussion are provided in Section IV.  
The final section offers concluding observations and some policy implications.   
 
 II. OVERVIEW OF THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
 
A. The lay judge system 
  Long-term economic decline Japan suffered during the 1990s forced the Government 
to institute various reforms to promote economic recovery under increasing 
international competitive pressure. “As part of this change, reformers also sought to 
revise the legal system. Japan‟s legal system has been widely criticized as being an 
insular bureaucracy detached from the needs of the people.”(Soldwedel 2008, p. 1419)5. 
In 1999, the government of Japan established the Justice System Reform Council 
(JSRC) for the purpose of studying basic policies and modifying the legal system. The 
legal reforms presented by JSRC are based on three pillars: (1) achieving “a justice 
system that meets public expectations”, (2) reforming “the legal profession supporting 
the justice system”, (3) “establishment of a popular base” (JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part 3).  
  The third pillar is concerned with the introduction of a lay judge system where 
citizens are required to take part in serious criminal trials6. “For the first time in 
Japan‟s judicial history, ordinary citizens will have their opinions directly reflected in 
trials, although Japan used a limited jury system between 1928 and 1943 in which 
jurors were chosen from among male tax payers over the age of 307.” (Japan Times, 
                                                   
5 In addition to realizing better justice and democracy, the lay judge system in the 21st 
century can be viewed as a measure for making trials shorter and more efficient under 
the increasing international competitive pressure (Anderson and Nolan 2004). 
Considering the origin of civil participation in trials, the innovations for the system 
were induced in response to the requirement for improvement of economic efficiency. 
“the use of laymen within the common law system was not the result of careful 
reflection or an appraisal of their virtues and defects; it came in the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries because of a driving need to economize on the time of professional 
judges” (Dawson 1960, p.293). 
6 The lay judge system of Japan is said to closely modeled on the French and German 
systems of “trial by consultation” or “mixed jury” where professional judges and citizens 
work together (Japan Times 2004; Boom 2005; Soldwedel, 2008).  
7 “A jury system based on the Anglo-American model was used…The underlying reason 
for its abolition must have been the failure of democracy in a country in the grip of 
2007). Lay judges are selected from lists of registered voters8. Although disagreement 
exists concerning the number of lay judges to be selected, members of panels are 
decided as follows: “six citizens are selected at random…under the guidance of three 
professional judges. The nine-member panels have to determine not only guilt or 
innocence, but also any punishment involved.” (Kamiya, 2009)9.  
The lay judge system aims to expand citizen participation in the justice system and to 
reflect public views on the administration of the courts. Actually, a simple calculation 
shows “About 2,600 cases that would be subject to a lay judge trial took place in fiscal 
2007, according to the Supreme Court. Based on that number, the court estimates that 
one in 5,000 citizens will likely participate in proceedings either as lay judges or their 
substitutes at 50 district courts and 10 branches nationwide.” (Kamaiya, 2008). 
Although the Supreme Court makes efforts to minimize the cost of serving as a lay 
judge10, about half of all Japanese citizens do not show any willingness to serve as a lay 
judge (Kyodo News 2007). Such a negative tendency makes it difficult to achieve the 
purpose of the lay judge system. One of the main reasons why people are reluctant to 
serve as a lay judge is the requirement that lay judges must not reveal trial related 
information11. The original plan for a penalty for a breach of confidentiality was that 
those who revealed details of deliberations could be imprisoned for up to one year or 
fined a maximum of 500,000 yen. In response to the criticism about the severity of the 
confidentiality requirements, “the revisions made in the Diet…calls for less stringent 
penalties.”(Japan Times 2004). For instance, lay judges who divulge privacy 
information or comments by panel members while on duty will be imprisoned for up to 
six months or fined a maximum of 500,000 yen. The same penalties will be imposed on 
those who reveal the “deliberation process” for monetary gain. Those who reveal the 
process without such intent will be fined up to 500,000 yen (Japan Times 2004). Despite 
                                                                                                                                                     
surging militarism.” (Japan Times, 2004). 
8 Citizens are ineligible for reasons such as advanced age, criminal history, membership 
of government, and employment status( Soldwedel 2008).  
9 The lay judge system differs from the jury system in the United States in various 
ways. For instance, lay judges decide issues of fact (guilty or innocence) and law 
(punishment), whereas United States juries only determine issues of fact (Jones 2008). 
The jury system, where generally unanimous verdicts are required for a conviction of a 
crime, a majority vote usually determines culpability in Japan‟s lay judge system (Jones 
2008). 
10 “Seven in 10 trials will be completed within 3 days” (Nakai 2008). “The detailed 
procedure… will help remove an unnecessary burden on people who cannot sit on the 
court bench from beginning to end “(Japan Times 2007). 
11 Information contains remarks made by panel members during deliberations and 
privacy matters involving people implicated in cases (Japan Times 2004) 
of the revisions, the severe requirements for confidentiality have a detrimental effect on 
a lay judge‟s activities and thus impede public participation (Japan Times 2004)12.   
 
B. Social networks and attitude to serve as a lay judge 
  Opinions vary regarding the effects on legal issues of the cultural characteristics of 
Japan. Some researchers point out that Japanese culture, which places a high value on 
group relationships and social norms provides a powerful deterrent for crime in Japan 
(e.g., Bloom 2005; Yamamura 2008b, 2009a). Kawashima (1963) focused on the cultural 
preference for informal mechanisms of dispute resolution in Japan, asserting that the 
harmonious nature of Japanese society discouraged people from litigating. If this line is 
followed, Japanese would appear as reluctant to serve as a lay judge. As a consequence, 
Japanese cultural attitudes will impede the effectiveness of a lay judge system (Bloom 
2005). Contrary to these assertions, considering traffic accidents, Ramseyer and 
Nakazato (1999:ch. 4) argued that despite the consensual nature of Japanese society 
and notwithstanding any costs involved in Japanese litigation, heirs do not ignore the 
law and do not eat their losses. Consistent with this, Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) find 
no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that cultural factors play a major role in 
Japan.  
Yamamura (2008a) bridged the gap between these opposing views concerning the 
effects of Japanese culture. Social interaction among community members was found to 
continue to play a crucial role for conflicts resolution in modern Japan, although to a 
certain extent people depended on lawyers to formally resolve conflicts(Yamamura 
2008a). If colleagues share various kinds of information and know each other through 
long-term and continual personal interaction, social networks among or social trust 
amongs them are formed (Hayami 2001). It is widely acknowledged that social networks 
enhance civic participation in formal or informal social activities (Putnam 2000). If this 
is correct, social networks would encourage people to serve as lay judges. Nevertheless, 
as earlier stated, the severe secrecy requirement inhibits lay judges from freely 
discussing trials with colleagues and family. Thus, in respect to a trial lay judges cannot 
behave as full members of their social network. It is now necessary to carefully deal 
with the relationship between a social network and civic participation in the lay judge 
system.  It is worthwhile to consider the question of how a social network is associated 
                                                   
12 The media expressed concern that heavy penalties would lead to the restriction of 
freedom of the press (Japan Times 2004). 
with the effectiveness of the lay judge system when the severe secrecy requirement 
exists.  
Figure 1 (a) shows a comparison between people with or without a spouse 
concerning willingness to serve as a lay judge. I see from it that people with a spouse 
are less apt to want to serve than those without a spouse. It seems appropriate that a 
basic personal relationship exists in a family. The relationship between a husband and 
wife can be considered to be profoundly intimate, even though there is the possibility of 
divorce. If this is true, I deduce from Figure 1 (a) that intimate interpersonal 
relationships discourage people from serving as a lay judge. Further, Figure 1 (b) 
compares long-residents and others; showing that long-residents are less likely to serve 
than others. I see from Figure 1 (c), comparing homeowners and non-homeowners, that 
homeowners are less inclined to serve than non-homeowners. Long-residents and 
homeowners are likely to invest in social capital and so be members of social networks 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber 2007). Considering that observed in Figure 1(b) 
and (c), social networks result in the impediment of people‟s participation in the lay 
judge system. This is contrary to the argument of Putnam (2000) that social networks 
enhance people‟s involvement in social activities. My conjecture is that the secrecy 
requirement imposes a large burden on lay judges who belong to a social network than 
it does on others. Ordinarily, people belonging to a social network are likely to freely 
discuss various matters with other members. Nevertheless, if people within a social 
network become a lay judge, if asked about a trial by a network member, they cannot 
discuss, resulting in a dilemma and psychological cost. Even if members of a social 
network do not ask about trial-related information, lay judges within a social network 
are frustrated at the inhibition related to revealing  trial-related information to 
members. Such frustration also seems to be interpreted as a psychological cost
13
. These 
arguments aree summarized in the following hypothesis about the effects of a social 
network on people‟s willingness to serve as a lay judge: 
Hypothesis: Interaction of the secrecy requirement causes negative externality of the 
social network, leading to impediment of people‟s participation in the lay judge system. 
 
 
 III. ESTIMATED MODEL AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
                                                   
13 According to the situation, a social network enhances punishing behavior, leading to 
a negative effect on its members (Reuben and van Winden 2008). 
 A. Data  
    This paper used individual level data including information such as attitude about 
serving as a lay judge, years of living at the current address, homeownership, schooling 
years, demographics (age and sex) status, and household income14. This data was 
compiled from: “Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st Century Japan” 
(GLOPE 2005 hereafter) conducted across all Japan in 2005. Sample points are divided 
into 5 groups. Cities and towns were divided into 5 groups according to population size; 
15 metropolitan cities, cities with at least 200,000 people, cities with at least 100,000 
people, other cities, and towns and villages. Three thousand adults were invited to 
participate in the survey with stratified two-stage random sampling. The survey 
collected data on 1397 adults, a response rate of 46.6%.  
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The original 
sample contained 1397 observations. Among these observations, 1200 responded to the 
question about the lay judge system. I omitted observations without valid answers for 
respondent‟s characteristics, thus the sample size became 774. This sample was used for 
the basic statistics in Table 2 and for the estimations reported in Table 3. Further, the 
774 samples were divided into residents in mega-cities (133) and other places (641. 
These samples were used for the estimations in Table 4. 
 
B.  Function form 
  Following from the discussion above, to examine people‟s willingness to serve as a 
lay judge, the estimated function takes the following form: 
 
Lay judge in = 0 + 1 (Spouse dummy) in +2 (Long residents) in + 3 (Homeowner) in 
+4(Female) in +5Ln (Schooling years) in +5Ln (Age) in +6 (Household income 
200~400) in +7 (Household income 400~600) in +8 (Household income 600~800) in +9 
(Household income 800~) in + fn + uimn , 
where Lay judge in represents the dependent variable in individual i, city size where 
individual resides n. Regression parameters are symbolized by ‟. ‟ reported in Tables 
3 and 4 is the marginal effect. Unobservable city size specific effects are represented by 
                                                   
14 Data for this secondary analysis is "Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st 
Century Japan(GLOPE 2005)”. This data was designed by Waseda University Centre of 
Excellence Program for the 21st Century: Constructing Open Political-Economic 
Systems(21 COE-GLOPE). The research was subcontracted to Chuo Chosa-Sha. Data 
was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
fn, and are controlled by dummy variables. uin represents the error term. The empirical 
model was estimated using Probit analysis since Lay judge is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if an individual is willing to serve as a lay judge, otherwise it is 0.  
I now turn to the key variables considered as proxies for a social network. Spouse 
dummy was 1 if a male had a spouse, otherwise it is 0. As shown in Figure 1(a), a 
willingness to serve as a lay judge depended on whether an individual had a spouse. 
Relation between husband and wife seems a basic ingredient of a social network. Spouse 
dummy was expected to take a negative sign. Long residents become 1 if an individual 
resides at the current address for longer than 20 years, otherwise it is 0. Homeowners 
become 1 if an individual owns a home, otherwise it is 0. As argued in earlier research 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007), long term residents and homeowners are 
more likely to belong to a social network. Long term residents and Homeowners are 
anticipated to take negative signs.  
With respect to other individual characteristics, Female is a gender dummy which 
takes 1 if an individual is female, otherwise 0. Schooling years and Age are individual‟s 
schooling years and ages, respectively. Schooling years and Age take log forms. 
Furthermore, household income level is captured by dummy variables. Those who have 
an annual household income lower than 2 million yen are defaulted. Household income 
2~4 takes 1 if an individual has a household income 2~4 million yen, otherwise 0. 
Household income 4~6 takes 1 if an individual has a household income 4~6 million yen, 
otherwise 0. Household income 6~8 takes 1 if an individual has a household income 6~8 
million yen, otherwise 0. Household income 8 ~ takes 1 if an individual has a household 
income higher than 8 million yen, otherwise 0. Coefficient values of household income 
dummies can be interpreted as measuring the degree of difference from the lowest 
household income group. 
  Social networks seem to decline with economic development (Greif 1994,2002). I 
deduce from this that suburban people appear to have closer social networks than urban 
dwellers since urban areas such as the 15 metropolitan cities are more likely to develop 
than other areas. Table 2 shows basic statistics of the variables used for estimations and 
compares the values of mega-cities (15 metropolitan cities) with those of other areas. 
Looking at the first row shows that 28.5 % of mega-city dwellers show a willingness to 
serve as a lay judge, while 24.9% of other areas do. This might be partly because social 
networks within mega cities are less intimate so that any negative externality coming 
from a social network is smaller. It is noteworthy that the human capital accumulated 
through education seems larger in urban areas15. Therefore urban people with basic 
knowledge about the law might feel at ease serving as a lay judge16. With respect to 
proxies for a social network, rates of having a spouse, long-term residents and 
homeowners in mega-cities are distinctly lower than other areas. In particular, the 
long-term resident rate for mega-cities (9.0%) is remarkably lower than for other areas 
(20.7). It follows from this that social networks in urban areas are smaller and more 
fragile than in other areas, which is consistent with my hypothesis. I see from schooling 
years that urban people are more educated than those in other areas, which supports 
the conjecture that human capital enhances people‟s involvement. 
That observed in Table 2 shows that socio-economic conditions vary according to city 
size. I divide the sample into residents in mega-cities (urban areas) and other places 
(other areas) and then conduct Probit estimation to investigate how and to what extent 
socio-economic circumstances influence people‟s attitudes. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A.  Resutls 
Table 3 sets out the results, using all samples, regarding willingness to serve as a lay 
judge. The results of using all independent variables are seen in  column (3). 
Long-term residents seem to be homeowners, resulting in correlation between the 
groups. Thus, to alleviate collinearity, alternative estimations omitting the homeowner 
dummy or the long-term residents dummy, are conducted. The results are reported in 
columns (1) and (2). As anticipated previously, the Spouse, Long-term residents and 
Homeowner dummies produced negative signs in all estimations, while most are also 
statistically significant. This implies that social networks reduce the incentive for 
people to serve as lay judges. The Female dummy takes a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level in all estimations. My interpretation is that 
people without a job can allocate time to form social networks, which are considered to 
be a positive externality caused by the labor market. In Japan, females are less likely to 
                                                   
15 In Japan, knowledge about the law is usually obtained at a university so that the 
effect of education on legally orientated participation is an increasing return to scale. 
16 Numbers of lawyers in urban areas are far larger than in other areas (Yamamura 
2008). There are greatly disproportionate numbers of cases of litigation between urban 
and other areas (Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006). This inevitably gives rise to differences of 
experience of trials between urban and other areas. It will be necessary to investigate 
how the experience of trials affects the attitudes of people toward the lay judge system. 
Nonetheless, because of a lack of data, such an investigation cannot be conducted at this 
time. 
have a full time job and so are more likely to belong to social networks (Yamamura, 
2009b). As a consequence, females are expected to incur larger psychological costs from 
serving as lay judges than males. In other words, the negative externality from a social 
network is larger for females than males.  
With respect to schooling years, signs of the coefficient become positive, implying that 
people with larger human capital are more inclined to participate in the lay judge 
system. Dummies of household income produced positive signs in all cases. Also, the 
larger both coefficient and t-values become, the higher household income levels are. 
This tells me that people with higher household incomes are more willing to serve as lay 
judges. My conjecture is that if one serves as a lay judge, one cannot work during the 
trial. In such a case, people working at large-scale enterprises are able to take paid 
leave17 . Those who work at a company in an economic slump or those who are 
self-employed, who can be considered to belong to a low income group, are expected to 
confront more serious difficulties in participation. A journalist specializing in judicial 
matters notes that the self-employed must close their businesses but cannot inform 
customers about the reason why the business is closed (Shukan Shincho 2008). This 
insincerity toward customers is predicted to result in a decrease of customers. It seems 
that workers at a debt-laden or insolvent company will not be able take paid leave. In 
some cases, these workers if serving as a lay judge might be dismissed for neglect of 
duty. As a consequence, self-employed people or those who work at a struggling 
company will be reluctant to serve as lay judges. 
For a closer examination, I turn to Table 4. Table 4 shows the results of using samples 
divided into residents in mega-cities and in other places to examine how socio-economic 
circumstances such as the labor or housing markets influence people‟s attitudes 
concerning the lay judge system. As proxies for the social network, the Spouse dummy 
produced positive signs in columns1)-(3) despite being statistically insignificant, 
whereas it produced significant negative signs in columns (4)-(6). My interpretation is 
that the wage level in urban areas is higher than other areas, causing urban people to 
allocate more time to work than to being with a spouse. Consequently, the relationship 
between husband and wife is less intimate in urban areas than others so that in urban 
areas having a spouse does not influence willingness to serve as a lay judge. Consistent 
with the expectation, the Long-term resident dummy yields the negative signs in 
mega-cities and other places while being, with the exception of column(3), statistically 
                                                   
17 It should be noted that household income cannot exactly reflect the individual‟s job 
status.  
significant. The Homeowner dummy produces the anticipated negative signs in all 
estimations. This is statistically significant at the 1 % level in urban areas but is not 
significant in other areas. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that absolute 
coefficient values in urban areas are approximately 0.25, which is distinctly larger than 
the 0.04 and 0.01 found in other areas. It follows from that observed about the 
Homeowner dummy that the homeowner effect is larger on the willingness to serve as a 
lay judge in urban areas than in other areas. According to Hilber (2007), in more 
built-up neighborhoods, homeowners are largely protected from inflows of newcomers 
that dilute the net benefit from social networks. Areas with little developable land are 
less apt to decrease the benefit from social networks and provide higher incentives to 
invest in social networks.  In Japan, urban areas are considered to be built-up ones 
with little developable land and therefore have greater social networks. Therefore, 
urban homeowners are more likely to enjoy not only social network benefits, but also 
incur higher psychological costs if serving as lay judges. Homeowners in urban areas 
will thus be more reluctant to serve as a lay judge than homeowners in other areas.  
The Female dummy produces negative signs in all estimations. This is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in non-urban areas but not significant in urban ones. It 
seems surprising that t absolute coefficient values for non-urban areas are over 0.10, 
which is about three times larger than in urban areas. Hence, there is a remarkable 
difference between genders about willingness to serve as lay judges in non-urban areas 
but there is no difference in urban ones. As argued by Jacobs, an urban area is 
characterized by a concentration of diverse industries (Jacobs 1969). Hence, a large 
number of different companies are located in urban areas and so the demand for labor is 
larger and has more variety than in other areas. Hence, females in urban areas have 
more opportunity to have a full-time job. Therefore, the market conditions females 
confront in urban areas does not differ from that of males, so that a female‟s attitude 
towards the lay judge system will not differ from a male‟s one. As a result of the larger 
labor supply and demand in urban areas, the labor market is thought to be more 
competitive and more functional. Hence, people in urban areas will have a greater 
chance to get a new job even if dismissed from one. As a consequence, labor is more 
mobile in urban areas. Under this labor market condition, job status is less likely to 
influence willingness to serve as a lay judge. Consistent with this anticipation, in urban 
areas, household income dummies yield both positive and negative signs and are not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, I see from the results of other areas, that 
moving from the lowest to the highest income group, the estimated coefficients and 
t-values increase monotonically, which is similar to those shown in Table 3. This is 
presumably because of the immobility of labor in other areas.  
Summing the various estimated results we have presented so far, we arrive at the 
conclusion that taken together, the estimation results examined in this section are 
consistent with, and supported reasonably well, each of the Hypotheses put forward in 
the preceding section. Furthermore, the social network effect on people‟s willingness to 
serve as lay judges varies according to socio-economic circumstances, which differ 
between urban and other areas.   
 
B.  Discussion 
Referring to historical the aspect of involvement in legal decision making, “Early 
English historical accounts demonstrate the important role played by community 
members without any particular training or specialization in law “(Hans 2003, p.84).  
Therefore, involvement of citizens in trials appears to be profoundly rooted in UK 
communities. Community is considered to play critical roles in alleviating both market 
and government failures, leading to economic development (Hayami 2001). Primarily, 
social capital accumulated through civic involvement within a local community leads 
people to further participate in various activities (Putnam 2000). Hence, community is 
considered to be important in creating an effective and well function lay judge system 
asn it enhances the participate of people in the system. According to JSRC, “…various 
reforms assume as a basic premise peoples‟ transformation from governed objects to 
governing subjects, and at the same time seek to promote such transformation. This is a 
transformation in which the people will break out of viewing the government as the 
ruler (the authority) and instead will take a greater responsibility for governance …” 
(JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part1). Contrary to the premise, the lay judge system in Japan 
was introduced by the Government, partly in response to international competitive 
pressures. The severe secrecy requirement inhibits those participating in the lay judge 
from openly discussing trials with family or community members, even after the end of 
a trial.   
Increasing international competitive pressure was thought to have induced 
institutional innovations such as the lay judge system in Japan. Hence, besides 
realizing better justice and democracy, it seems critical to educate the public about 
trials from the standpoint of economics. This is because accumulation of human capital 
is expected to improve the efficiency of trials. Learning from others such as family and 
neighbors appears to play a crucial role in accumulating human capital through social 
networks18. The strong requirements such as that for life time secrecy, seem to impede 
such mechanisms, resulting in a loss of efficiency. This loss is anticipated to become 
especially large when social networks exist and many people belong to such networks. It 
is thus appropriately argued that the obligation and its penalty on lay judges should be 
eased to improve operational efficiency.  
As mentioned earlier in the Section II, the secrecy requirement has been revised in 
response to criticism. Although the revisions are expected to make a contribution to 
enhancing peoples‟ participation, they are insufficient. Minimizing the negative 
externality caused by any breach of confidentiality, and maximize the positive 
externality of information spillover are greatly significant goals. They lead to 
increasinge the net benefit of the lay judge system. Concerning information regarding 
privacy, it seems appropriately argued that the positive externality of the leakage of 
private information is small since such information fails to make a contribution to the 
accumulation of human capital. On the other hand, its negative externality is large 
since a fundamental human right is trampled on19. Furthermore, an individual will 
incur large psychological costs if his/her private information is leaked. Hence, it is 
appropriate to ensure such confidentiality. On the other hand, with respect to the 
“deliberation process”, such information is anticipated to make a great contribution to 
the education of members of the public concerning trials20. After the end of a trial, 
revealing the “deliberation process” is less likely to cause any negative effect since the 
results of the trail are not influenced. As a consequence, leakages regarding the 
“deliberation process” should not be punished if several years have passed after the end 
of the trial.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The introduction of a lay judge system has been designed to bring about benefits to 
modern Japanese society by enhancing public trust in the justice system (JSRC 2001). 
However, various surveys indicate that over half of those eligible to participate showed 
                                                   
18 Local spillovers such as learning from others play an important role in economic 
development (Goolsbee and Klenow 2002; Yamamura 2008c). 
19 The basic human right is based on the article 13 of the constitutional law. 
20 In the “Jury system” of U,S., a jury can discuss freely “the deliberation process” after 
the trial(Jones 2008, p112.). 
no willingness to serve as a lay judge, although the Ministry of Justice made efforts to 
encourage people to participate. To increase the benefits of the system, it will be 
necessary to consider the design of the lay judge system as this has an influence on the 
people‟s incentive to participate. This research paid attention to the secrecy 
requirement, which is thought to raise the psychological cost to serve as a lay judge. 
Socio-economic factors also appear to influence people‟s perception and are associated 
with the effects of the secrecy requirement, leading to negative attitudes about the lay 
judge system. Hence, this work set out to investigate how and why incentives to serve as 
a lay judge decrease by considering interactions between the secrecy requirement and 
social networks. I found through regression analyses that those who belong to a social 
network are less likely to be willing to serve as a lay judge. 
The closer the relationships within a family or neighbors, the higher the 
psychological costs to keep the secrecy requirement becomes. Therefore, not only as a 
result of this feature of the system and socio-economic conditions, but also from their 
interaction, incentives to serve as a lay judge decrease. Tightly knitted interpersonal 
ties are thus shown to discourage people from serving as lay judges. Because of the life 
time secrecy obligation and the penalties faced by those who break it, people with close 
interpersonal ties are under greatr pressure and strain, leading to large psychological 
costs. From this situation I derive the argument that the obligation and its penalties 
should be eased to improve the attitude of people‟ toward the lay judge system. 
Furthermore, to educate the public about trials and to have their view reflected in the 
administration of the courts, it seems useful and productive for people who have 
participated in the system to talk over aspects of the trial with family and colleagues 
(Jones 2008). Information spillover from participants appears to be able to make a great 
contribution to the “establishment of a popular base”, which is one of the three main 
aims of the Justice System Reform (JSRC 2001). Considering a revision of the secrecy 
requirement more closely, information about the “deliberation process” appears useful 
and important when learning about trials, leading to benefits in the long run. On the 
other hand, this information is less likely to cause any negative externality as time will 
have passed.  These leads me to suggest that the lifetime secrecy obligation about the 
“deliberation process” should be abolished and that information should be able to be 
divulged if several years have passed since the end of the trial.  
This study does not directly examine interactions between the secrecy requirement 
and social networks since the effects of the secrecy requirement cannot be captured by 
the sample used. Hence, the results coming out of this study depend on the possibly 
debatable assumption that social networks are negatively related to people‟s attitudes, 
mainly as a result of the secrecy requirement. Following the argument of Putnam (2000), 
social networks would enhance people‟s involvement without such a secrecy 
requirement. It is noteworthy that the detrimental effect of social networks could be 
explained in other ways. Hence, it will be necessary to directly investigate how the 
secrecy requirement and social networks are associated regarding their influences on 
people‟s attitudes about the lay judge system. To this end, further research is called for 
to explore the effects of social networks if the secrecy requirement were to be revised 
after the introduction of the lay judge system. This is an issue remaining to be 
addressed in future research. 
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FIGURE 1 
Rate of respondents showing willingness to serve as a lay judge.  
 
 
(a) Comparison between those with or without spouse (%) 
 
 
(b) Comparison between long-term residents and others (%) 
 
 
(c) Comparison between homeowner and non-homeowner (%) 
 
TABLE 1 
 Sample construction (Sample numbers) 
 Description  
Original Sample 
 
 1397 
One responds to a question about serving as a lay judge.  
 
 1200 
Characteristics (various variables appear in Table 2 and 
household income dummies).  
774 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4)  
   Respondents reside in mega-cities 
 
133 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4) 
   Respondents reside in other cities, towns or villages. 
 
641 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 Comparisons between residents in mega-cities and others. 
Variables Mega-cities Others  ALL 
Respondents showing willingness to 
serve as a lay judge. (%) 
28.5 24.9 25.5 
Have a spouse (%) 
 
  72.1 81.7  80.1 
Long-residents (%) 
 
   9.0   20.7   18.7 
Home-owner (%) 
 
  67.6   81.5   79.1 
Females (%) 
 
  39.0   48.5   46.8 
Years.of schooling    13.2   12.4 
 
  12.6 
Age 
 
  56.6   54.6   55.0 
Household Income  
~200 million yen (%) 
  10.5    9.6    9.8 
Household Income  
200~400 million yen (%) 
  32.3   30.5   30.8 
Household Income  
400~600 million yen (%) 
  26.3   24.0   24.4 
Household Income  
600~800 million yen (%) 
   9.7   17.3   16.0 
Household Income  
800~  million yen (%) 
  21.0   18.4   18.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Determinants of willingness to serve as a lay judge (Probit Model Estimation) 
Variables    (1) 
   
  (2) 
  
   (3) 
 
Spouse dummy 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.86) 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
-0.07* 
(-1.76) 
Long residents dummy 
 
-0.12** 
(-3.21) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.87) 
Homeowner dummy. 
 
  
 
 -0.09* 
(-2.08) 
 -0.06 
(-1.48) 
Female dummy. 
 
-0.12** 
(-4.05) 
-0.10** 
(-3.24) 
-0.12** 
(-3.80) 
Log (schooling Years) 0.31** 
(3.67) 
0.33** 
(3.92) 
0.32** 
(3.75) 
Log(Age) -0.09 
(-1.59) 
-0.04 
(-0.71) 
-0.06 
(-1.00) 
Household Income  
200~400 million yen dummy. 
0.006 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
Household Income  
400~600 million yen dummy. 
0.06 
(0.94) 
0.08 
(1.25) 
0.07 
(1.12) 
Household Income  
600~800 million yen dummy. 
0.13* 
(1.68) 
0.15* 
(1.93) 
0.14* 
(1.86) 
Household Income  
800~  million yen dummy. 
0.20** 
(2.66) 
0.23** 
(2.98) 
0.22** 
(2.87) 
Obs 774 774 774 
Pseudo R-square 0.10 0.09  0.10 
Note. The dummy variable, which takes 1 if respondent shows willingness to serve as a lay judge, was the 
dependent variable. Values show marginal effect of each variable. Values in parentheses are z-statistics 
calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In 
all estimations, constant and city-size dummies are included, but not reported to save space. Concerning 
household income dummies, group of household income less than 200 million yen is default.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  TABLE 4 
Determinants of willingness to serve as a lay judge (Probit Model Estimation) 
Variables    (1) 
   
  (2) 
  
   (3) 
 
    (4) 
   
  (5) 
  
   (6) 
 
      Residents in mega-cities. 
     ( Urban areas ) 
  Residents in other places. 
Spouse dummy 
 
0.09 
(0.97) 
0.08 
(0.89) 
0.08 
(0.90) 
 -0.13** 
(-2.56) 
-0.11* 
(-2.30) 
-0.13** 
(-2.55) 
Long residents dummy 
 
-0.19* 
(-1.65) 
 -0.15 
(-1.32) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.93) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.85) 
Homeowner dummy. 
 
  
 
-0.26** 
(-2.76) 
-0.24** 
(-2.49) 
   
 
 -0.04 
(-0.84) 
 -0.01 
(-1.48) 
Female dummy. 
 
-0.10 
(-1.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
-0.05 
(-0.65) 
 -0.13** 
(-3.83) 
-0.10** 
(-3.18) 
-0.13** 
(-3.76) 
Log (Years of schooling) 0.41* 
(2.16) 
0.37* 
(2.12) 
0.43** 
(2.33) 
 0.31** 
(3.37) 
0.34** 
(3.63) 
0.31** 
(3.38) 
Log(Age) -0.15 
(-1.17) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
 -0.06 
(-1.09) 
-0.04 
(-0.62) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
Household Income  
200~400 million yen dummy. 
-0.06 
(-0.47) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
-0.02 
(-0.19) 
 0.02 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
Household Income  
400~600 million yen dummy. 
-0.009 
(-0.06) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.37) 
 0.07 
(1.00) 
0.09 
(1.24) 
0.08 
(1.03) 
Household Income  
600~800 million yen dummy. 
-0.07 
(-0.04) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
 0.15* 
(1.82) 
0.16* 
(1.94) 
0.16* 
(1.84) 
Household Income  
800~  million yen dummy. 
0.15 
(0.87) 
0.25 
(1.32) 
0.25 
(1.32) 
 0.20** 
(2.36) 
0.22** 
(2.53) 
0.21** 
(2.38) 
Obs 133 133 133  641 641 641 
Pseudo R-square 0.11 0.13 0.14  0.10 0.09  0.10 
Note. The dummy variable, which takes 1 if respondent shows willingness to serve as a lay judge, was the dependent variable. Values 
show marginal effect of each variable. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and city-size dummies are included, but not reported to 
save space. Concerning household income dummies, group of household Income less than 200 million yens is default. 
 
